The trade credit channel revisited:evidence from micro data of Japanese small firms by Ogawa, Kazuo et al.
  
 University of Groningen
The trade credit channel revisited





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2013
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Ogawa, K., Sterken, E., & Tokutsu, I. (2013). The trade credit channel revisited: evidence from micro data
of Japanese small firms. Small Business Economics, 40(1), 101-118. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-011-
9344-5
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
The trade credit channel revisited: evidence from micro
data of Japanese small firms
Kazuo Ogawa • Elmer Sterken • Ichiro Tokutsu
Accepted: 11 April 2011 / Published online: 3 June 2011
 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2011
Abstract It is suggested that trade credit can be a
substitute for bank loans for small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) that have little access to external
funding sources. Using unique cross-sectional survey
data of Japanese SMEs, we conduct a deep investi-
gation into the substitutability between bank loans
and trade credit. This survey contains rich informa-
tion on the suppliers of trade credit to SMEs, thus
enabling the examination of the channel through
which credit is provided from suppliers to customers.
We find that SMEs with little access to bank credit
depend more on large suppliers for trade credit. We
also find that when a purchase is made from a large
supplier, more credit is indeed provided in the form
of trade credit. Furthermore, this channel of credit
from large suppliers to SMEs is only observed for
solvent customers, not for insolvent customers. Our
findings suggest that trade credit plays an important
role for entrepreneurial firms over the financial
growth cycle. For young and small firms with little
access to bank loans trade credit is an important
funding source.
Keywords Trade credit  Bank loans 
Redistribution of credit  Insolvency
JEL Classifications D22  L14  G20  L26
1 Introduction
It has been asserted that trade credit is a substitute for
bank loans. This is especially true for small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have few
alternative credit sources and are more likely to face
credit rationing during a tight monetary regime. The
substitution mechanism premise maintains that sup-
pliers with better access to credit will redistribute the
credit they receive to SMEs by way of trade credit.
This is the so-called redistributional view of trade
credit. The redistributional hypothesis has two
important testable implications. First, SMEs with
little access to bank credit depend more on large
suppliers for trade credit. Here, we proxy accessibil-
ity to bank credit by firm size. Second, a considerable
amount of credit is provided by large suppliers to
SMEs in the form of trade credit. This trade credit
channel might be potent, especially during periods of
tight money when the SMEs are more likely to be
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constrained in the bank credit market. As appealing
as these implications are, very few tests of this
hypothesis have been conducted using micro data.
This is probably due to the paucity of firm-level
transaction and relationship data between suppliers
and customers.
The aim of this study is to test the redistributional
hypothesis of trade credit from the corporate demand
side by using unique cross-sectional data of Japanese
SMEs. The dataset is the Basis Survey of Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises conducted by the Small and
Medium Enterprise Agency. It is a comprehensive
survey that was initiated in the 2004 fiscal year to
investigate financial and managerial aspects of SMEs as
well as business investment trends. The survey includes
information on transactions between firms (the firms to
which goods are sold and the firms from whom goods
are purchased) in addition to balance sheets and profit
and loss statements of individual SMEs.
This dataset is ideal for examining the redistribu-
tional role of trade credit from the demand side, as
the customers that benefit most from credit redistri-
bution are SMEs, and our dataset contains rich
information about the suppliers of trade credit to
SMEs. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is
no other dataset like ours that contains this kind of
detailed information about suppliers. We test two key
implications of the redistributional hypothesis of
trade credit. First, we examine the relationship of the
dependence on bank credit by SMEs whose vendors
are large firms. Second, we examine the amount of
accounts payable extended to the SMEs by large
suppliers. Consider an SME that has limited access to
bank credit and is likely to be borrowing-constrained.
If the SME increases transactions with large suppliers
and they extend trade credit to the SME, then we can
say that the redistributional hypothesis is supported.
Our estimation results show that the redistributional
hypothesis is indeed supported for solvent firms but
not for insolvent firms.
Furthermore, we find that bank loans and trade
credits are substitutes even for insolvent firms, but
substitutability is independent of the extent to which
purchases are made from large suppliers.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2
surveys past studies on the redistributional hypothesis
of trade credit and contrasts our study with the prior
literature. We also state the testing procedure of the
redistributional hypothesis. Section 3 explains the
dataset we use and provides the descriptive statistics
on trade credit of the Japanese SMEs in our dataset.
Section 4 presents the empirical evidence on the
redistributional hypothesis of trade credit. Section 5
concludes the study.
2 Redistributional view of trade credit: literature
survey and empirical strategy
2.1 Literature survey and contribution
of our study
Meltzer (1960) first emphasized the redistributional
role of trade credit. He hypothesized that firms with
easy access to bank credit can increase credit in the
form of trade credit more easily than those firms that
are constrained in the bank loan market. In general,
the firms with easy access to bank credit are large
firms, and those constrained in the bank loan market
are small firms. Thus, the result is a redistribution of
credit among firms by size. He found evidence for
this redistributional view in the time series data,
especially during periods of tight money. Following
this study, Jaffe (1971), Ramey (1992) and Nilsen
(2002) obtained similar evidence supporting the
redistributional view from time series data.1
Petersen and Rajan (1997) conducted the first
study, based on U.S. firm-level data, of the redistri-
butional role of credit. Based on the National Survey
of Small Business Finance (NSSBF), they found that
a firm’s access to external finance has a significantly
positive effect on the number of accounts receivable.
They also found that firms with large unused lines of
credit demand less trade credit. Furthermore, they
found that a longer relationship with a financial
institution is negatively correlated with a demand for
trade credit. Thus, they concluded that trade credit is
used mainly by firms that are constrained by their
institutional lenders.2 Nilsen (2002) extended the
Petersen and Rajan (1997) study for listed firms and
1 Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), on the other hand, find that
trade credit does not increase during a period of tight money.
2 In contrast, Giannetti et al. (2011) challenged the notion that
the firms with little access to bank credit use trade credit. Based
on the 1998 NSSBF, they found that the firms receiving trade
credit secure financing from relatively uninformed banks. It
implies that the extension of trade credit reveals favorable
information to other lenders.
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found that even large firms increase demand for trade
credit during periods of tight money if they have no
bond rating. In the context of the commercial paper
market, Calomiris et al. (1995) found that the
correlation between inventory changes and accounts
payable is relatively high for firms without access to
public debt markets. This supports the contention that
when hit by an unanticipated increase in inventories,
firms without access to commercial paper partly
finance increased inventories by increasing their
accounts payable to firms with better access to
short-term credit. De Haan and Sterken (2006) used
a pan-European dataset of both listed and unlisted
firms and found that a monetary contraction affects
private firms’ trade credit more negatively than the
trade credit positions of public firms.
A study by Love et al. (2007) focused on the
redistributional role of trade credit based on interna-
tional micro data. They showed that the redistribution
channel shuts down during financial crises when all
sources of finance available to large firms dry up.
Using data of firms operating during the 1994 peso
devaluation in Mexico and the 1997 Asian crisis, they
found that accounts receivable drop sharply during
the post-crisis period. They concluded that the firms’
lack of access to bank loans forces them to reduce the
supply of trade credit to the SMEs.
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) use unique survey
data of Vietnamese firms that contain detailed
information on the relationships between individual
firms and their customers. By estimating the supply
equation of trade credit, they found no relationship
between offering credit to customers and receiving
bank loans. However, they found that receiving credit
from suppliers significantly increases the likelihood
of offering credit to customers.
As for evidence specific to Japan, there are a
growing number of studies that address this issue. For
example, Ono (2001) and Ogawa (2003) are two
recent studies that are based on time series data. Ono
used the interest differential between the bank loan
rate and the bill discount rate as one of the
determinants of accounts payable and found that, on
the whole, this interest differential exerts a signifi-
cantly positive effect on accounts payable, indicating
that trade credit and bank loans are substitutes.
Ogawa (2003) included the lending attitude of
financial institutions as one of the explanatory
variables in a trade credit regression and found that
when the lending attitude becomes more severe,
accounts payable of medium-sized firms increase
significantly, supporting the redistributional view.3
On the other hand, Taketa and Udell (2006) find some
evidence that trade credit and financial institution
lending are complements of one another during
periods of financial crisis.
The Takehiro and Ohkusa (1995) study is the first
that is based on micro data of Japanese firms. Using
the panel data of listed firms over 26 years
(1967–1992), they found that an increasing severity
in lending attitudes of financial institutions signifi-
cantly reduces trade credit. This evidence suggests
that bank credit and trade credit are complements
rather than substitutes. Uchida et al. (2006) investi-
gate the relationship between bank loans and trade
credit by using a variable to represent the strength of
the buyer–seller relationship in a bank loan regres-
sion. Their results are favorable and support the view
that while bank loans and trade credit are comple-
ments, they are statistically insignificant.
Other studies based on micro data are generally
favorable to the redistributional view. Using the
Credit Risk Database, Tsuruta (2008) found that
when the bank loan rate increases, borrowers increase
trade credit. Tsuruta (2007) also found evidence of
trade credit problems during the Asian financial
turmoil in 1997 and 1998 using the same dataset.
Using the data of large trading companies that supply
both loans and trade credit, Uesugi and Yamashiro
(2004) found that large trading companies increase
accounts receivable when banks are unwilling to
lend.
On the other hand, Uesugi (2005), using micro
data of SMEs for the period from 2001 to 2003, found
that trade credit and bank loans are complements.
Fukuda et al. (2006) showed that substitutions
between bank loans and trade credit are observed
when the banking sector is healthy but that during the
financial crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s,
bank loans and trade credit contracted at the same
time. This evidence is in line with Love et al. (2007).
3 Lending attitude of financial institutions, released by the
Bank of Japan, is a diffusion index that is the proportion of the
firm’s feeling the current lending attitude of financial institu-
tions is accommodating minus that of the firm’s feeling the
current lending attitude of financial institutions is severe.
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To summarize the evidence from the studies in Japan,
the redistributional view, as a whole, is supported by
both time series and micro data, but the complemen-
tary relationship between bank lending and trade
credit is also observed during periods of financial
crises.4
What has been lacking in past empirical studies
that have examined the redistributional view of trade
credit is that the information on the suppliers that
provide trade credit and the customers that receive
trade credit is not taken into account explicitly when
bank credit becomes difficult to obtain. An exception
is the study of Boissay and Gropp (2007). Based on a
unique dataset of French firms, they estimate trade
credit default chains. They show that small, illiquid
firms with little access to outside financing pass
liquidity shocks on to their suppliers by defaulting on
trade credit. In this way, liquidity shocks are trans-
mitted down from trade credit chains until they reach
large firms with access to outside financing to absorb
the shocks and inject new liquidity into the system.
Indeed, their study finds indirect evidence that
supports the redistributional view of trade credit by
focusing on the trade credit default chains. However,
they do not examine whether large and liquid firms
extend more trade credit to illiquid firms with little
access to outside financing.
We, however, take a more direct approach to test
the redistributional view of trade credit. The redistri-
butional view states that large firms that have greater
access to bank loans increase the supply of trade
credit to the small- and medium-sized customers
constrained in the bank loan market. To test this view
rigorously, we need transaction data of trade credit
between firms. Fortunately, our micro data, to be
explained in detail in the next section, contains
information on the fraction of SMEs that purchase
from large suppliers, which enables us to shed light
on the redistributional view from the demand side.
Given this information, we test two implications of
the redistributional hypothesis. First, we examine the
relationship between SMEs’ bank dependence and
their transactions with large suppliers. According to
the redistributional view, when SMEs have weaker
relationships with banks, they cannot raise funds
easily from banks at a lower price so that they will be
more inclined to depend on large suppliers for trade
credit.
Second, we examine the link between dependence
on large suppliers and the amount of trade credit
given to the SMEs. It is expected that the more reliant
SMEs are on large suppliers, the more credit will be
provided in the form of accounts payable to the
SMEs. Testable equations corresponding to the two
implications above will be formalized in Sect. 4.
Should the two implications both be supported by the
data, we may conclude that the redistributional
hypothesis of trade credit is valid.
2.2 Empirical strategy
As is clear from the discussions above, the test of the
redistributional view is restated as an examination of
the extent to which trade credit can be substituted for
bank loans. Therefore, the essential problem with
finding evidence of the redistributional view of trade
credit is the identification of the effects of supply and
demand. Although we attempt to shed light on the
distributional view from the demand side of trade
credit, it should be noted that dependence on large
suppliers, a key variable linking the two implications
when testing the distributional view, is endogenous.
For example, a positive productivity shock to large
suppliers might induce them to sell their products at
favorable conditions on trade credit. This may then
prompt customers to switch from small to large
suppliers, a change accompanied by an increase in
accounts payable. Note that, in this example, a
positive correlation between dependence on large
suppliers and accounts payable originates from a
shock to suppliers.
Therefore, in testing the redistributional hypothe-
sis of trade credit from the demand side, it is essential
to extract from the total variations of dependence on
large suppliers those attributable to the demand side
of trade credit. To be more specific, we need an
instrument of customers’ attributes that can be used
to explain the dependence on large suppliers. This
identification problem can be solved by making use
of institutional information about credit rationing and
other informational asymmetries of customers. One
candidate appropriate for an instrument can be found
in the bank-firm relationship or the main bank
4 Japan’s Small Business Research Institute (2005) also states
that trade credit is a substitute for bank loans for small firms
with less liquidity. Its analysis is based on descriptive statistics
of firm-level data.
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relationship of customers. In Japan, a firm usually
establishes a long-term relationship with a specific
bank, referred to as the main bank. Main banks play
the role of delegated monitors and supply loans to
their affiliated firms. Information of affiliated firms is
accumulated in main banks by way of long-term
multiple transactions, which play a vital role in
mitigating asymmetry of information between lenders
and borrowers. As will be explained in detail in the
next section, we have the information on what type of
main bank the sample firms are affiliated. If a firm is
affiliated with a city bank, a large bank operated by
both domestic and foreign operations, cheap credit is
available from the main bank so that the firm has less
incentive to purchase from large suppliers to obtain
credit in the form of trade credit. Thus, we observe
less dependence on large suppliers and, hence, less
demand for accounts payable. In other words, by
regressing the extent to which a customer depends on
large suppliers on the main bank information of the
customer, our instrument, with other explanatory
variables we obtain the predicted value of the
regression, that is, the variations of the dependence
on large suppliers attributable to the demand factors
of trade credit.
3 Data characteristics and descriptive statistics
of SME trade credit
The Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law in
Japan stipulates that rigorous statistical investigations
should be conducted to understand the actual condi-
tions of SMEs. To attain this goal, the SME Agency
has conducted the Basic Survey of Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises since the fiscal year of
2004. This is a comprehensive survey that investi-
gates all aspects of SMEs, including financial condi-
tions, managerial information and the trend of
business investments.5
The survey includes important information on
transactions of intermediate goods between firms in
addition to the basic balance sheet (B/S) and profit
and loss (P/L) statements of individual SMEs.
Specifically, it has information on the fraction of
goods purchased from large and small suppliers as
well as the fraction of intermediate goods sold to
large and small enterprises and individual consum-
ers.6 This information can be used to shed light on the
pattern of trade credit between firms of different
sizes.
In this study, we use the survey from fiscal year
2004. We randomly selected 100,000 firms from 4.35
million SMEs in all of Japan. The number of firms
available in the survey for our statistical purpose was
41,807, but the information on accounts payable and
related statistics was available only for the subset of
1,659 firms on which our study is based.7 Table 1
compares the distribution of sampled firms across
industries in our study with the distribution of 12,603
incorporated firms in the survey where full informa-
tion on B/S and P/L statements is available. In our
study, the wholesale industry has the largest share
(35.7%) followed by the retail industry (24.5%) and
the manufacturing industry (18.4%), while in the
survey, the transportation industry has the largest
share (22.5%), followed by the service industry
(15.9%) and the manufacturing industry (12.2%).
The first column of panel A in Table 2 shows the
distribution of sampled firms by employees in our
study, which is compared with that in the survey (the
fourth column). Approximately one-fourth of the
firms have fewer than five employees, while one-third
have more than 50 employees. The first (fourth)
5 In the survey, an SME is defined as an enterprise with equity
capital less than 300 million yen or total employees less than
300 persons for construction, transportation, manufacturing
and some of the real estate and service industries. For the other
industries, the SME is defined as an enterprise with an even
smaller amount of equity capital and/or a fewer number of
employees.
6 The definition of the SME in footnote 5 is applicable
throughout the article.
7 In 41,807 sample firms, 12,603 firms are incorporated firms
and the rest are proprietorships. The full information on B/S
and P/L statements is available only for the former firm group;
only limited information is available for the latter group. In
addition, because our main concern is bank-firm relationships,
firms with no responses to the questions on bank-firm relations,
which amount to 6,256 out of 12,603 firms, are excluded from
the sample. The information on the buyer of intermediate
inputs is also indispensable in this study, which is available for
3,265 firms. After excluding firms with inconsistent items in
B/S and P/L statements, together with the data screening stated
above, the number of firms in the final sample is reduced to
1,659. Detailed comparative information of the data charac-
teristics between our study and the original survey is available
from the following website:
http://www2.kobe-u.ac.jp/*tokutsu/PDF/SBE_Data_Appendix.
pdf.
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column of panel B in Table 2 shows the distribution
of sampled firms in our study (in the survey) by
equity capital. Surprisingly, approximately half of the
sampled firms both in our study and in the survey
have less than 10 million yen equity capital. The
distribution of sampled firms by firm size closely
represents the original distribution of the survey.
A major advantage of the survey is that it contains
rich information on the main bank relationships. The
first column of panel A in Table 3 shows with what
type of main bank the sample firms are affiliated. The
main bank of approximately half of the sampled firms
is a regional bank that has its banking business in the
prefecture of the firms’ headquarters. Approximately
27% of the sampled firms selected a city bank as their
main bank. Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives,
financial institutions that exclusively lend to SMEs,
were chosen as the main bank by 22% of the sampled
firms.
The information on the type of collateral and
personal guarantees and on the response of the main
bank to loan applications is also summarized in the
Table 1 Sample
distribution by industry
The figures are the
percentage of the total
Data source: Basic Survey








(1) Construction 66 (4.0) 1,376 (10.9)
Manufacturing: (2) to (23) 306 (18.4) 1,541 (12.2)
(2) Food products 58 (3.5) 181 (1.4)
(3) Beverage, tobacco, and fodder 11 (0.7) 20 (0.2)
(4) Textiles 8 (0.5) 57 (0.5)
(5) Wearing apparel 14 (0.8) 60 (0.5)
(6) Wood products except furniture 16 (1.0) 49 (0.4)
(7) Furniture 3 (0.2) 19 (0.2)
(8) Paper and paper products 7 (0.4) 56 (0.4)
(9) Printing and publishing 9 (0.5) 115 (0.9)
(10) Chemicals and chemical products 15 (0.9) 54 (0.4)
(11) Coal and oil products 1 (0.1) 2 (0.0)
(12) Plastic products 25 (1.5) 87 (0.7)
(13) Rubber products 4 (0.2) 19 (0.2)
(14) Leather and leather products 3 (0.2) 9 (0.1)
(15) Stone, clay, and glasses 19 (1.1) 59 (0.5)
(16) Iron and steel 12 (0.7) 43 (0.3)
(17) Non-ferrous metal products 4 (0.2) 26 (0.2)
(18) Metal products 24 (1.4) 140 (1.1)
(19) General machinery 33 (2.0) 193 (1.5)
(20) Electrical machinery 25 (1.5) 188 (1.5)
(21) Transportation equipment 6 (0.4) 101 (0.8)
(22) Precision instrument 5 (0.3) 34 (0.3)
(23) Miscellaneous manufacturing 4 (0.2) 29 (0.2)
(24) Information and communication 49 (3.0) 790 (6.3)
(25) Transportation 59 (3.6) 2,830 (22.5)
(26) Wholesale 593 (35.7) 1,383 (11.0)
(27) Real estate 34 (2.0) 1,271 (10.1)
(28) Hotels and restaurants 29 (1.7) 463 (3.7)
(29) Service 117 (7.1) 2,001 (15.9)
(30) Retail 406 (24.5) 948 (7.5)
Total 1,659 (100.0) 12,603 (100.0)
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first column of panels B and C in Table 3, respec-
tively. As seen in the tables, more than 60% of the
firm owners in the sample pledged collateral or
personal guarantees to their main banks. Actually,
18.4% of the firm owners pledged both collateral and
personal guarantees.
As for the response of the main bank to a loan
application, the loan application was accepted as is in
nearly half of the cases. A loan application was
turned down or reduced for only 7.1% of the sampled
firms. It should be noted that for more than one-fourth
of the firms, the main bank offered loans above the
amount or with less stringent lending conditions than
in the original applications.
Table 4 shows the mean, median and standard
deviations of major items on the balance sheet and
profit and loss statements as well as variables related
to trade credit. The mean of total assets and sales are
1,385 and 1,860 million yen, while the corresponding
medians are 369 and 584 million yen, respectively.
Mean values far exceed median values, indicating
that their frequency distributions are skewed to the
right. The mean (median) of the number of employ-
ees is 58 (31). The average ratio of borrowing from
financial institutions to total debt and that of short-
term borrowing from financial institutions to current
liabilities, proxies of bank dependence, are 0.52 and
0.30, respectively.8
The mean ratios of accounts receivable and
accounts payable to sales are 0.150 and 0.118,
respectively.9 These ratios are much higher than
those of small firms in the 1988 to 1989 NSSBF and
are comparable to Compustat data on large firms in
the U.S.10 The mean ratio of accounts payable to total
equity plus debt is 0.193, which is somewhat higher
than U.S. counterparts (0.1578) in Berger and Udell
(1998). Judging from these figures, the SMEs in
Japan depend more on accounts payable as sources of
Table 2 Sample distribution by scale of firms
















Panel A: number of employees
(1) 5 or less 393 (23.7) 262 (18.6) 131 (52.6) 3,599 (28.6)
(2) 6–20 334 (20.1) 276 (19.6) 58 (23.3) 3,119 (24.7)
(3) 21–50 410 (24.7) 375 (26.6) 35 (14.1) 3,228 (25.6)
(4) More than 50 522 (31.5) 497 (35.2) 25 (10.0) 2,657 (21.1)
Total 1,659 1,410 249 10,616
Panel B: equity capital
(1) 10 million yen or less 815 (49.1) 633 (44.9) 182 (73.1) 7,284 (57.8)
(2) More than 10 million yen to 30 million yen 402 (24.2) 363 (25.7) 39 (15.7) 2,909 (23.1)
(3) More than 30 million yen to 50 million yen 221 (13.3) 205 (14.5) 16 (6.4) 1,217 (9.7)
(4) More than 50 million yen to 100 million yen 160 (9.6) 153 (10.9) 7 (2.8) 791 (6.3)
(5) More than 100 million yen to 300 million yen 45 (2.7) 41 (2.9) 4 (1.6) 260 (2.1)
(6) More than 300 million yen 16 (1.0) 15 (1.1) 1 (0.4) 142 (1.1)
Total 1,659 1,410 249 12,603
The figures in parentheses are the percentage of the number of corresponding firms in the sub-samples
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 2004
8 The average ratio of borrowing from financial institutions to
total debt for U.S. small firms is 0.5293 in Berger and Udell
(1998), which is quite close to ours.
9 In fact, 3.7% of firms recorded a zero balance on accounts
payable.
10 Petersen and Rajan (1997) reported that the mean ratio of
accounts receivable and accounts payable to sales is 0.073 and
0.044, respectively, for the National Survey samples, while the
corresponding ratios are 0.185 and 0.116 for the Compustat
firms.
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debt than do those in the United States. The mean
ratios of purchases from large suppliers and small
suppliers are 32.2 and 67.8%, respectively.11,12
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of the
ratio of purchases from large suppliers. Approxi-
mately half of the sample firms make no purchases
from large suppliers while one-tenth of the sample
firms exclusively purchase from large suppliers. It
should be noted that the ratios of purchases from
large suppliers exhibit considerable variations across
industries. Table 5 shows the mean and median ratios
of purchases from large suppliers and borrowing to
total debt as well as other important variables across
industries. The mean ratio of purchases from large
suppliers is highest in information and communica-
tions (64.4%) and lowest in hotels and restaurants
(4.4%).

















Panel A: type of main bank
(1) City banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks 447 (26.9) 404 (28.7) 43 (17.3) 3,266 (28.8)
(2) Regional and second-tier regional banks 791 (47.7) 678 (48.1) 113 (45.4) 4,871 (43.0)
(3) Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives 362 (21.8) 281 (19.9) 81 (32.5) 2,612 (23.1)
(4) Government financial institutions for SME 42 (2.5) 33 (2.3) 9 (3.6) 244 (2.2)
(5) Other government financial institutions 4 (0.2) 3 (0.2) 1 (0.4) 54 (0.5)
(6) Financial institutions for agriculture 8 (0.5) 8 (0.6) 0 (0.0) 124 (1.1)
(7) No main bank 5 (0.3) 3 (0.2) 2 (0.8) 151 (1.3)
Total 1,659 1,410 249 12,603
Panel B: terms of loan contract
(1) Physical collateral 1,049 (63.2) 906 (64.3) 143 (57.4) 5,496 (51.0)
(2) Personal guarantee 1143 (68.9) 979 (69.4) 164 (65.9) 6,020 (55.8)
(3) Third party guarantee 256 (15.4) 208 (14.8) 48 (19.3) 1,392 (12.9)
(4) Public guarantee 746 (45.0) 613 (43.5) 133 (53.4) 3,811 (35.4)
(5) Neither collateral nor guarantee 103 (6.2) 93 (6.6) 10 (4.0) 1,513 (14.0)
Total 1,659 1,410 249 12,603
Panel C: firm-specific main bank lending condition
(1) Loan application was rejected or reduced 118 (7.1) 63 (4.5) 55 (22.1) 544 (8.3)
(2) Loan application was accepted as it was 739 (44.5) 648 (46.0) 91 (36.5) 2,992 (45.9)
(3) The lending condition became severe 354 (21.3) 271 (19.2) 83 (33.3) 1,445 (22.1)
(4) The lending condition was loosened 138 (8.3) 130 (9.2) 8 (3.2) 532 (8.2)
(5) Additional loan was offered by the main bank 310 (18.7) 298 (21.1) 12 (4.8) 1,012 (15.5)
Total 1,659 1,410 249 12,603
The figures in parentheses are the percentage of the number of corresponding firms in the sub samples. In column (4) of Panel A and
C, adding up the numbers across rows is not equal to the total since original survey contains firms with incomplete information such
as ‘‘no response.’’ In Panel B, since the respondents can make more than two choices, the percentages of five choices do not sum up to
100
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 2004
11 The denominator of the ratio of purchases from large and
small suppliers is purchases from domestic suppliers, excluding
purchases from foreign suppliers. Hence, the ratios of
purchases from large and small suppliers sum up to unity.
12 The median proportion of purchases from large suppliers is
only 5%, and its frequency distribution is heavily skewed to the
right.
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4 Empirical examination of the redistributional
view of trade credit
4.1 Specification of the redistributional
hypothesis of trade credit
As stated in Sect. 2, we tested two key implications of
the redistributional role of trade credit from the firm’s
demand side. First, we investigated the relationship of
a customer’s dependence on bank loans with the
extent to which the customer purchases from large
suppliers. We formalized this step as follows.
LARGEVENDORi ¼ a0 þ a1 log SALESi




bjDUMINDJi þ ei ð1Þ
where LARGEVENDORi is the proportion of inter-
mediate goods purchased from large suppliers,
SALESi is the sales, PROFITi is the ratio of operating
profit to sales, DEBTi is the debt-asset ratio, BANK-
DEPENDi is the customer’s dependence on bank
loans, DUMINDJi is the industry dummies, and ei is
the i.i.d. error term.13
The dependent variable, LARGEVENDORi, is the
fraction of intermediate goods purchased by firm
i from large suppliers. A customer’s dependence on
Table 4 Descriptive statistics
of major variables in the
sample
Unit of the variables except for
ratios and the number of
employees is millions of yen.
The capital letters after the
variable definitions are the
abbreviated variable names
used in the regression analysis










Account receivable 304 52 746
Account payable 271 45 765
Total assets 1,385 369 4,421
Total debt 1,081 278 4,042
Total sales, SALES 1,860 584 4,088
Number of employees (persons) 58 31 84
Operating profit 40 6 183
Borrowing from financial institutions 583 132 2,739
Ratio of purchase from small supplier 0.678 0.950 0.390
Ratio of purchase from large supplier, LARGEVENDOR 0.322 0.050 0.390
Account receivable/total sales 0.150 0.122 0.148
Account payable/total sales, ACPAYABLE 0.118 0.087 0.115
Account payable/(total debt ? equity) 0.193 0.145 0.186
Total asset/total sales, ASSET 0.904 0.640 1.146
Operating profit/total sales, PROFIT 0.012 0.013 0.105
Borrowing from financial institutions/total debt,
BANKLOAN
0.520 0.545 0.258
Short-term borrowing from financial institutions/current
liabilities, SHORTLOAN
0.300 0.250 0.278








0.0 0.0 - 0.2 0.2 - 0.4 0.4 - 0.6 0.6 - 0.8 0.8 - 1.0 1.0
%
48.0
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Fig. 1 Frequency distribution of the ratio of purchases from
large suppliers: LARGEVENDOR
13 The subscript i represents the i-th firm.
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bank loans, BANKDEPENDi, is measured by two
alternative variables: the ratio of borrowing from
financial institutions to total debt, expressed by
BANKLOANi, and the ratio of short-term borrowing
from financial institutions to current liabilities,
SHORTLOANi. The former captures the total rela-
tionship between the customer and the financial
institution, while the latter emphasizes the short-term
dependence. The correlation coefficient between
BANKLOANi and SHORTLOANi is 0.5732. Accord-
ing to the redistributional view of trade credit, less
dependence on bank loans makes customers more
dependent on trade credit from large suppliers. Thus,
we expect a4 to be negative.
A number of variables are used to control for firm
attributes. First, firm size is measured by the
logarithm of sales, or log SALESi. A firm’s profit-
ability is measured by the ratio of operating profit to
sales, or PROFITi. We include the debt-asset ratio,
DEBTi, to measure the debt burden of the firm. We
also include 29 industry dummies, DUMINDJi.
14
Second, we investigate the relationship between a
customer’s dependence on large suppliers and the
amount of its accounts payable. We estimate the
following reduced form equation for accounts
payable.
















(1) Construction 0.242 0.126 0.017 0.809 0.454 0.303 0.731
Manufacturing: (2) to (23) 0.215 0.137 0.021 1.001 0.568 0.369 0.754
(24) Information and
communication
0.644 0.054 0.013 0.654 0.537 0.302 0.762
(25) Transportation 0.238 0.081 -0.009 0.824 0.562 0.279 0.853
(26) Wholesale 0.318 0.154 0.011 0.713 0.479 0.279 0.900
(27) Real estate 0.339 0.042 0.123 4.194 0.575 0.317 0.852
(28) Restaurant and hotels 0.044 0.034 -0.017 1.427 0.597 0.290 0.885
(29) Service 0.275 0.075 0.011 1.093 0.519 0.260 0.833
(30) Retail 0.425 0.090 0.003 0.798 0.537 0.292 0.915
Total 0.322 0.118 0.012 0.904 0.520 0.300 0.858
Panel B: median
(1) Construction 0.000 0.103 0.014 0.692 0.460 0.289 0.765
Manufacturing: (2) to (23) 0.000 0.116 0.019 0.897 0.603 0.338 0.776
(24) Information and
communication
0.750 0.039 0.009 0.577 0.622 0.212 0.773
(25) Transportation 0.000 0.049 0.015 0.765 0.641 0.204 0.828
(26) Wholesale 0.100 0.121 0.011 0.556 0.483 0.234 0.845
(27) Real estate 0.000 0.030 0.096 3.621 0.611 0.254 0.872
(28) Restaurant and hotels 0.000 0.023 0.031 1.359 0.719 0.204 0.890
(29) Service 0.000 0.051 0.017 0.700 0.520 0.239 0.819
(30) Retail 0.300 0.067 0.008 0.528 0.580 0.240 0.863
Total 0.050 0.087 0.013 0.640 0.545 0.250 0.830
For the abbreviation of the variables, see the note in Table 4
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 2004
14 For a detailed industry classification, see Table 1. In the
estimation, the second industry, food products, is taken as the
base industry. Accordingly, we incorporate 29 constant dummy
variables corresponding to the industry numbers (1) to (30) in
the table, DUMIND1 to DUMIND30 except for DUMIND2.
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ACPAYABLEi ¼ d0 þ d1ASSETi þ d2PROFITi












#jDUMINDJi þ ni ð2Þ
where ACPAYABLEi is the ratio of balance of
accounts payable to sales, ASSETi is the ratio of total
assets to sales, CONTRACTJi is the terms of a loan
contract with main bank, LENDATTITUDEJi is the
lending attitude of the main bank, and ni is the i.i.d.
error term.
When the redistributional hypothesis of trade
credit is valid, the customer who is more dependent
on large suppliers will receive larger amounts of
accounts payable. In other words, we expect d4 to be
positive. The effects of a firm’s wealth and profit-
ability on accounts payable are measured by the ratio
of total assets to sales, ASSETi, and profits to sales,
PROFITi, respectively. The variable BANKDEPENDi
measures the direct effect of bank dependence on
accounts payable, taking a customer’s dependence on
large suppliers as constant. Even if the dependence
on large suppliers remains unchanged, increasing
availability of bank loans will reduce demand for
accounts payable as long as bank loans are a cheaper
source of funds than trade credit.
We control the effect of the loan supply conditions
on accounts payable using two different variables.
One is the terms of the loan contract with the main
bank, or CONTRACTJi. The CONTRACTJi variables
are the dummy variables, each of which corresponds
to the loan contract shown in rows 1–5 of panel B in
Table 3; that is to say, CONTRACT1i takes unity if
the firm owner pledges physical collateral to its main
bank, CONTRACT2i takes unity if the firm owner
guarantees to repay the principal in case of default
and so on. The base is the case of neither collateral
nor personal guarantee such that the number of
dummies is four: CONTRACT1 to CONTRACT4.
The other variable is the firm-specific main bank
lending conditions, LENDATTITUDEJi. The LEN-
DATTITUDEJi variable consists of the following four
dummy variables that correspond to the firm-specific
main bank lending conditions of rows 1–5 in panel C
of Table 3: LENDATTITUDE1i takes unity if a loan
application to its main bank was turned down or
reduced, LENDATTITUDE3i takes unity if the firm-
specific main bank lending conditions increase in
severity, and so on. We incorporate four dummies,
LENDATTITUDE1i to LENDATTITUDE5i, with the
exception of LENDATTITUDE2i. The 29 industry
dummies are also included as explanatory variables.
Taking the first and second implications together,
we can say that the redistributional hypothesis of trade
credit is valid only for the case where a4 \ 0 in Eq. 1
and d4 [ 0 in Eq. 2 are supported simultaneously.
4.2 Micro data evidence on the redistributional
hypothesis of trade credit
In estimating Eq. 1, we take endogeneity of sales into
consideration. Sales and an unobservable error term
of Eq. 1 may be negatively correlated as negative
productivity shock to SMEs will reduce sales, and
they thus become more dependent on large suppliers
in anticipation of trade credit. The instrument is a
dummy variable (DUMBANKJ) for the customer’s
type of main bank. As we explain in Sect. 3, main
bank dummies consist of six dummies, each of which
corresponds to one type of bank in rows 1–7 in panel
A of Table 3; that is to say, DUMBANK2 takes unity
if the main bank is a regional bank, DUMBANK3
takes unity if the main bank is a shinkin bank and
credit cooperative, and so on. Because we select the
case where the main bank is a city bank as the base,
DUMBANK1 is omitted, and the number of main
bank dummies is 6: DUMBANK2 to DUMBANK7.
Because LARGEVENDORi is below unity and
must be at least zero, we use a two-limit Tobit
regression. The proportion of LARGEVENDORi that
takes zero is nearly 50%, as shown in Fig. 1. The
estimation results of Eq. 1 by Tobit are shown in the
first and second columns in panel A of Table 6. The
third and fourth columns show the estimation results
by instrumental variable Tobit with the Wald statis-
tics to test endogeneity of sales. Instrumental variable
Tobit is conducted in two steps. In the first step, we
estimate the reduced form of sales by OLS and
obtain the reduced-form OLS residuals. Then, in
the second step, we estimate a standard Tobit of
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LARGEVENDOR on the original variables plus the
residual. We then obtain the consistent estimates of
the parameters.15 The Wald test cannot reject exoge-
neity of sales, irrespective of the measure of a
customer’s dependence on financial institutions.
When BANKLOANi is used as a measure of a
customer’s dependence on financial institutions, the
coefficient estimate of BANKLOANi is significantly
negative, which implies that the customer who is
more dependent on bank loans will purchase less
from large suppliers. This is consistent with the
Table 6 Determinants of ratio of purchase from large firms, LARGEVENDOR
Determinants Tobit estimation Tobit estimation with instrumental variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: basic regression
CONST. -2.1571 (9.81)*** -2.3165 (10.9)*** -2.0307 (3.84)*** -2.1936 (4.26)***
Log SALES 0.1662 (12.2)*** 0.1703 (12.3)*** 0.1563 (3.78)*** 0.1603 (3.84)***
PROFIT -0.2107 (1.02) -0.2280 (1.10) -0.1902 (0.86) -0.2078 (0.94)
DEBT 0.1080 (2.33)** 0.1115 (2.39)** 0.0994 (1.72)* 0.1028 (1.76)*
BANKLOAN -0.2392 (3.02)*** -0.2403 (3.03)***
SHORTLOAN -0.0979 (1.32) -0.0907 (1.13)
r 0.7136 0.7157
n (0,1) 1,659 (797,158) 1,658 (796, 158) 1,659 (797,158) 1,658 (796, 158)
Log of likelihood -1,447.4 -1,450.1
Wald v2 0.03 0.03
Pseudo R2 0.0958 0.0937
Panel B: regression with insolvent dummy variable, DUMINSOLVENT
CONST. -2.2791 (9.60)*** -2.4642 (10.5)*** -2.2355 (4.25)*** -2.3928 (4.64)***
Log SALES 0.1647 (11.1)*** 0.1733 (11.5)*** 0.1614 (3.69)*** 0.1674 (3.78)***
PROFIT -0.3477 (1.47) -0.3563 (1.50) -0.3402 (1.39) -0.3449 (1.40)
DEBT 0.2947 (2.43)** 0.2110 (1.77)* 0.2959 (2.40)** 0.2120 (1.78)*
BANKLOAN -0.3395 (3.80)*** -0.3402 (3.70)***
SHORTLOAN -0.1476 (1.79)* -0.1439 (1.66)*
DUMINSOLVENT 0.8281 (1.22) 1.0117 (1.52) -0.6203 (0.35) -0.4066 (0.22)
Log SALES 9 DUMINSOLVENT -0.0313 (0.68) -0.0407 (0.88) 0.0883 (0.60) 0.0766 (0.50)
PROFIT 9 DUMINSOLVENT 0.5417 (1.11) 0.5427 (1.11) 0.2989 (0.53) 0.3115 (0.55)
DEBT 9 DUMINSOLVENT -0.2250 (1.62) -0.1408 (1.03) -0.1799 (1.19) -0.0972 (0.65)
BANKLOAN 9 DUMINSOLVENT 0.3790 (1.69)* 0.3546 (1.54)
SHORTLOAN 9 DUMINSOLVENT 0.2417 (1.19) 0.1960 (0.91)
r 0.7064 0.7094
n (0,1) 1,645 (783,158) 1,644 (782,158) 1,644 (782,158) 1,643 (781,158)
Log of likelihood -1,431.9 -1,436.5
Wald v2 0.23 0.20
Pseudo R2 0.0995 0.0961
The figures in parentheses are the t-values for Tobit model and z-values for Tobit model with instrumental variables in absolute value.
The symbols *, ** and *** indicate that the corresponding coefficients are significant at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. r is the estimated
standard error of the regression. Wald v2 is for the test of endogeneity of log of SALES. The symbol n(0,1) stands for the number of
observations and the figures in parenthesis are the number of observations censored at 0 and 1, respectively. To avoid the collinearity
caused by the cross-term of DUMINSOLVENT with industry dummy variables or main bank dummy variables as instruments, 15
observations are omitted from the sample in the regression with DUMINSOLVENT. Similarly, a sample firm with missing current
liabilities data is omitted in the regression with SHORTLOAN
15 See Smith and Blundell (1986) for more details on
instrumental variable Tobit.
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redistributional hypothesis of trade credit. On the
other hand, when SHORTLOANi is used instead of
BANKLOANi, its coefficient is negative but not
significant. We also find that the customer with a
higher debt-asset ratio tends to purchase more from
large suppliers, irrespective of the customer-bank
relationship variable. This finding might reflect
increasing difficulty for the customer burdened with
heavy debt to borrow from banks.
We turn to the estimation results of Eq. 2.16 First,
we examine endogeneity of LARGEVENDOR by the
Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test. The instruments
are debt-asset ratio and six main bank dummies.17
The DWH statistics are 3.28 and 5.75 for BANK-
LOAN and SHORTLOAN cases, respectively, such
that exogeneity of LARGEVENDOR is rejected at the
5% significance level for the SHORTLOAN case. The
estimation results by instrumental variables are
shown in the first and second columns of Table 7.
To test whether the additional instruments are valid in
the sense that they are uncorrelated with the error
term, we conduct the Sargan test. The Sargan test
cannot reject the over-identification restrictions at the
5% significance level for either a BANKLOAN or
SHORTLOAN case.
We find that the customer with large assets relative
to sales who is less dependent on banks has more
accounts payable. Furthermore, the LARGEVENDORi
variable exerts a significantly positive effect on
accounts payable, irrespective of the customer-bank
relationship variable. In other words, when a pur-
chase is made from large suppliers, more credit is
provided in the form of trade credit. This is also
consistent with the redistributional hypothesis. To
combine the evidence obtained from the estimation of
the two equations above, we confirm the redistribu-
tional role of trade credit for Japanese SMEs. When a
firm does not have close ties with financial
institutions, it tends to purchase from large suppliers
to secure credit, which, in turn, leads to an increase in
accounts payable.
To see the quantitative importance of the redistri-
butional role of trade credit, we compute the differ-
ence in the ratio of accounts payable to sales across
industries coming from the difference in LARG-
EVENDORi. As presented in the previous section, the
LARGEVENDORi variable exhibits wide variations
across industries. The LARGEVENDOR ranges from
0.644 for information and communication to 0.044
for hotels and restaurant, as is shown in Table 5.
Thus, the difference in the ratio of purchases from
large suppliers makes a 9.6 (0.1599 9 0.6) percent-
age point to a 12.6 (0.2103 9 0.6) percentage point
difference in the ratio of accounts payable to sales at
the maximum.
4.3 The redistributional hypothesis and firm
distress
To see whether the redistributional role of trade credit
is prevalent across firms, we re-estimate Eqs. 1 and 2
and classify firms into two different groups. One
group consists of firms whose debt exceeds total
assets, or insolvent firms, and the other group consists
of solvent firms whose debt is less than their total
assets. Before examining the estimation results, we
compare firm characteristics between solvent and
insolvent firms. The second and third columns of
Tables 2 and 3 show firm size in terms of number of
employees and equity capital, type of main bank,
terms of loan contract and firm-specific main bank
lending conditions for both solvent firms and insol-
vent firms. Insolvent firms are generally smaller in
terms of number of employees and equity capital. The
main banks of insolvent firms are also smaller in size
as 17.3% (28.7%) of main banks for insolvent
(solvent) firms are city banks, long-term credit banks
and trust banks, whereas 32.5% (19.9%) are shinkin
banks and credit cooperatives.
Table 8 compares the descriptive statistics of
major variables between solvent and insolvent firms.
Insolvent firms earn much less operating profit than
solvent firms. Insolvent firms are less dependent on
bank loans in terms of total and short-term borrowing
and less dependent on large suppliers. As for the ratio
of accounts payable to sales, there is no difference
between solvent and insolvent firms, although the
16 Although accounts payable are zero for some firms, the
proportion of such firms is only 3.7% of the sampled firms;
therefore, we do not use Tobit-type estimation.
17 In the first step, we fail to reject exogeneity of sales, which
might justify the use of the sales variable as a valid instrument.
However, when we allow for different responses of trade credit
to bank dependence for solvent and insolvent firms, it turns out
that the Sargan test rejects over-identification restrictions when
the sales variable is included as an instrument. Therefore, we
do not use sales as an instrument.
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ratio of accounts receivable to sales is lower for
insolvent firms.
Equations 1 and 2 are re-estimated by incorporat-
ing an insolvent dummy (DUMINSOLVENT) and its
interacting terms with explanatory variables. The
estimation results of Eq. 1 by Tobit are shown in the
first and second columns in panel B of Table 6 and
those by instrumental variable Tobit are shown in the
third and fourth columns in panel B of Table 6.
Exogeneity of sales is not rejected by the Wald test
for either a BANKLOAN or SHORTLOAN case. The
estimation results of Eq. 2 by instrumental variables
Table 7 Determinants of account payable ratio, ACPAYABLE
Determinants Without DUMINSOLVENT With DUMINSOLVENT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONST. 0.0744 (2.98)*** 0.0511 (2.18)** 0.0049 (0.15) 0.0036 (0.12)
LARGEVENDOR 0.1599 (2.08)** 0.2103 (2.51)** 0.4250 (5.14)*** 0.4382 (4.74)***
PROFIT 0.0109 (0.41) 0.0101 (0.35) -0.0073 (0.15) -0.0065 (0.14)
ASSET 0.0321 (10.8)*** 0.0330 (9.88)*** 0.0416 (8.23)*** 0.0434 (8.04)***
BANKLOAN -0.1103 (7.69)*** -0.0894 (3.92)***
SHORTLOAN -0.0992 (8.96)*** -0.1126 (6.55)***
CONTRACT1 0.0163 (2.09)** 0.0096 (1.25) 0.0056 (0.50) 0.0035 (0.32)
CONTRACT2 0.0100 (1.49) 0.0053 (0.69) 0.0232 (2.15)** 0.0190 (1.64)
CONTRACT3 0.0138 (1.61) 0.0157 (1.66)* 0.0303 (2.30)** 0.0309 (2.26)**
CONTRACT4 0.0130 (2.00)** 0.0082 (1.10) 0.0301 (2.97)*** 0.0250 (2.30)**
LENDATTITUDE1 0.0026 (0.23) -0.0020 (0.16) -0.0278 (1.22) -0.0308 (1.30)
LENDATTITUDE3 0.0109 (1.48) 0.0072 (0.92) -0.0013 (0.10) -0.0014 (0.11)
LENDATTITUDE4 -0.0107 (1.04) -0.0150 (1.34) -0.0157 (0.99) -0.0189 (1.16)
LENDATTITUDE5 -0.0170 (2.07)** -0.0200 (2.23)** -0.0267 (2.23)** -0.0285 (2.32)**
DUMINSOLVENT 0.2111 (2.03)** 0.1972 (1.91)*
LARGEVENDOR 9 DUMINSOLVENT -0.4804 (2.46)** -0.4843 (2.37)**
PROFIT 9 DUMINSOLVENT 0.1508 (1.50) 0.1466 (1.44)
ASSET 9 DUMINSOLVENT -0.0163 (1.64) -0.0191 (1.87)*
BANKLOAN 9 DUMINSOLVENT 0.0386 (0.80)
SHORTLOAN 9 DUMINSOLVENT 0.0551 (1.28)
CONTRACT1 9 DUMINSOLVENT -0.0294 (1.09) -0.0252 (0.93)
CONTRACT2 9 DUMINSOLVENT -0.0048 (0.18) -0.0019 (0.07)
CONTRACT3 9 DUMINSOLVENT -0.0452 (1.41) -0.0457 (1.40)
CONTRACT4 9 DUMINSOLVENT -0.0385 (1.57) -0.0365 (1.45)
LENDATTITUDE1 9 DUMINSOLVENT 0.0852 (2.22)** 0.0824 (2.12)**
LENDATTITUDE3 9 DUMINSOLVENT 0.0236 (0.78) 0.0187 (0.62)
LENDATTITUDE4 9 DUMINSOLVENT -0.0242 (0.36) -0.0251 (0.37)
LENDATTITUDE5 9 DUMINSOLVENT 0.0552 (0.85) 0.0615 (0.94)
n 1,659 1,658 1,659 1,658
cR2/nR2 0.1049 0.5673 -0.0469 0.4942 -1.0437 0.0122 -1.1029 0.0160
F 11.4*** 8.98*** 3.37*** 2.92***
Root MSE 0.1084 0.1172 0.1637 0.1661
DWH v2 3.28* 5.75** 67.8*** 54.7***
Sargan v2 12.4* 12.2* 11.8 11.1
The symbols cR2 and nR2 stand for centered R2 and non-centered R2, respectively. F is for the test of zero slope coefficients. DWH v2
is for the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity of LARGVENDOR. Sargan v2 is for the test of over-identifying restrictions
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are shown in the third and fourth columns of
Table 7.18 The BANKLOANi variable exerts a signif-
icantly negative effect on LARGEVENDORi, which,
in turn, affects accounts payable in a significantly
positive manner. When the SHORTLOANi variable is
used, its coefficient is negative and barely significant
at the 10% level in Eq. 1 and significantly negative at
the 1% level in Eq. 2. It implies that the redistribu-
tional role of trade credit is valid for solvent Japanese
SMEs.
On the other hand, the cross term of bank
dependence with insolvent dummy is insignificant
in Eq. 1 except for a BANKLOAN case by Tobit
estimation. Thus, there is no difference in the effects
of bank dependence on the proportion of purchase
from large suppliers between solvent and insolvent
SMEs. In Eq. 2, the coefficient estimate of the cross
term of LARGEVENDORi with insolent dummy
is significantly negative. The marginal effect of
LARGEVENDOR on accounts payable for insolvent
firms is nearly zero.19 Thus, even if the insolvent firm
increases its purchases from large suppliers, accounts
payable are not necessarily extended to the insolvent
firms.
In summary, the redistributional hypothesis of
trade credit is only applicable for solvent SMEs, not
for insolvent SMEs.
4.4 Substitutability between bank loans and trade
credit
Note that the coefficient estimate of LENDATTI-
TUDE1i, which indicates that the loan application is
Table 8 Descriptive statistics of major variables in the sub-sample
Statistics (1) (2) (3) (4)
Solvent firms Insolvent firms
Mean Median Mean Median
Account receivable 349 69 53 12
Account payable 309 59 55 10
Total assets 1,571 524 329 74
Total debt 1,203 347 391 99
Total sales, SALES 2,114 744 419 133
Number of employees (person) 64 36 22 8
Operating profit 47 9 -1 0
Borrowing from financial institutions 645 169 228 43
Ratio of purchase from small supplier 0.671 0.900 0.721 1.000
Ratio of purchase from large supplier, LARGEVENDOR 0.329 0.100 0.279 0.000
Account receivable/total sales 0.155 0.126 0.119 0.089
Account payable/total sales, ACPAYABLE 0.119 0.088 0.114 0.082
Account payable/(total debt ? equity) 0.186 0.142 0.233 0.152
Total asset/total sales, ASSET 0.907 0.662 0.887 0.499
Operating profit/total sales, PROFIT 0.018 0.014 -0.021 0.000
Borrowing from financial institutions/total debt, BANKLOAN 0.525 0.556 0.495 0.492
Short-term borrowing from financial institutions/current liabilities,
SHORTLOAN
0.306 0.263 0.266 0.148
Total debt/total asset, DEBT 0.746 0.792 1.496 1.221
See the note in Table 4
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 2004
18 The instruments we use are debt-asset ratio, six main bank
dummies and their cross terms with insolvent dummy.
19 In fact, the marginal effects of LARGEVENDOR on
ACPAYABLE for insolvent firms are -0.0554 and -0.0461
for BANKLOAN and SHORTLOAN cases, respectively.
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rejected or reduced by the main bank, is significantly
positive for insolvent firms in Table 7, while it is not
significant for solvent firms. When a loan application
submitted to a main bank by an insolvent firm is
rejected or reduced, it is accompanied by an increase in
accounts payable. This suggests that accounts payable
are a substitute for bank loans for insolvent firms. The
importance of trade credit for insolvent firms is also
seen from the significantly positive coefficient of the
dummy variable, DUMINSOLVENT, in the third and
fourth columns of Table 7.20 This appears a bit
contradictory to the evidence above that finds the
redistributional role of trade credit is not supported for
insolvent firms. We interpret this puzzling evidence as
follows. When a loan application is rejected by the
main bank, the insolvent firm tries to secure credit in
the form of trade credit. Note that 73% of insolvent
firms are very small with equity capital less than 10
million yen (panel B of Table 2). The estimation
results of Eq. 1 show that smaller firms, measured by
the logarithm of sales, tend to purchase from smaller
suppliers. Therefore, it may be the case that trade credit
for insolvent small firms is not necessarily supplied by
large suppliers but by SME suppliers that do not, in
general, have easy access to other sources of funds.21
This implies that substitutability between bank loans
and trade credit for insolvent firms is independent of
the redistributional hypothesis.
4.5 Evidence by industry
For a check of robustness, we estimate Eqs. 1 and 2
separately for major industries that have a sufficient
number of observations. In our estimation, we include
an insolvent dummy and its interactive terms with
explanatory variables. We selected four industries:
manufacturing, wholesale, service and retail indus-
tries. The estimation results of Eq. 1 are shown in
panel A of Table 9. To save space, we show only the
coefficient estimates of BANKLOAN and SHORT-
LOAN by Tobit and instrumental variable Tobit. The
effect of customer’s dependence on bank loans on the
proportion of purchases from large suppliers is
negative for all industries and significant at the 5%
level for manufacturing and wholesale industries.
The estimation results of Eq. 2 estimated by
instrumental variables are shown in panel B of
Table 9. To save space, we show only the coefficient
estimates of LARGEVENDOR with the DWH statis-
tics and the Sargan statistics. The DWH statistics
indicate that LARGEVENDOR is endogenous, and the
Sargan statistics indicate that the instrumental vari-
ables are indeed valid. The coefficient estimate of
LARGEVENDOR is significantly positive in all four
industries. To sum up the estimation results by
industry, the redistributional hypothesis is supported
in the manufacturing industry where intermediate
goods are actively transacted across sectors.
5 Concluding remarks
This article investigates the redistributional role of
trade credit from the demand side based on unique
micro data from Japanese SMEs for which informa-
tion on transactions between firms of different sizes is
available. Two implications of the redistributional
hypothesis are tested. First, we examine the relation-
ship of bank dependence, measured by the ratio of
borrowing from financial institutions to total debt,
and the ratio of short-term borrowing from financial
institutions to current liabilities with dependence on
large suppliers. Second, we examine the effect of a
dependence on large suppliers on the amount of
accounts payable. We find evidence supporting the
redistributional hypothesis for solvent firms. In other
words, less dependence on bank loans will make
customers more dependent on large suppliers, which,
in turn, leads to an increase in accounts payable.
However, the redistributional hypothesis is not
supported for insolvent firms. It is true that substi-
tutability is observed between bank loans and trade
20 As for the importance of trade credit for insolvent firms,
Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue that suppliers are more
willing than banks to renegotiate their claims or grant
additional debt when their customers get into financial distress
as suppliers’ rents from selling goods to their customers are
lost if the customers are liquidated upon default. Wilner (2000)
also argues that suppliers are more dependent on their
customers than credit market lenders. Similarly, Franks and
Nyborg (1996) show that sunk investments in the customer–
supplier relationship make suppliers more lenient toward
financially distressed customers. Using Belgian data on first-
time business start-ups, Huyghebaert et al. (2007) found that
firms in industries with high historical start-up failure rates and
entrepreneurs who highly value private benefits of control
prefer trade credit to bank loans.
21 In this case, insolvency might be propagated to other SME
suppliers that extend credit to insolvent firms, as their balance
sheets also deteriorate.
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credit even for insolvent firms, but substitutability is
independent of the extent to which purchases are
made from large suppliers.
Our findings have important implications on the
financing behavior of young small firms. In general,
young firms are informationally opaque, which
makes it difficult for them to have easy access to
external finances, forcing them to rely on inside
financing, venture capital and/or angel financing. Our
study suggests that in addition to these financing
means, trade credit is also an important source for
young firms with little access to bank loans.22 In the
course of daily transactions of intermediate goods,
suppliers will be able to accumulate information on
small customers. Therefore, the perpetual transac-
tions with a certain supplier may signal the quality of
young firms to financial institutions, which will
eventually help young firms to appropriate external
financing. In this way, trade credit plays an important
role for infant firms over the long-term financial
growth cycle.
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Panel A: (1) LARGEVENDOR equation by Tobit estimation
BANKLOAN SHORTLOAN
Whole industry -0.3395 (3.80)*** -0.1476 (1.79)*
Manufacturing -0.5897 (2.85)*** -0.3533 (1.90)*
Wholesale -0.1714 (1.35) -0.0342 (0.29)
Service -0.5777 (1.56) -0.0942 (0.26)
Retail -0.3418 (1.74)* -0.2243 (1.26)
(2) LARGEVENDOR equation by Tobit estimation with instrumental variables
BANKLOAN SHORTLOAN
Whole industry -0.3402 (3.70)*** -0.1439 (1.66)*
Manufacturing -0.6172 (2.91)*** -0.3895 (1.82)*
Wholesale -0.1993 (1.40) -0.0112 (0.09)
Service -0.5095 (1.30) -0.8260 (2.12)**
Retail -0.3596 (1.81)* -0.1566 (0.76)
Panel B: ACPAYABLE equation by instrumental variables
LARGEVENDOR DWH v2 Sargan v2 LARGEVENDOR DWH v2 Sargan v2
Whole industry 0.4250 (5.14)*** 67.8*** 11.8 0.4382 (4.74)*** 54.7*** 11.1
Manufacturing 0.8224 (2.33)*** 52.2*** 1.96 0.8845 (1.89)* 37.3*** 2.20
Wholesale 0.3850 (3.36)*** 20.3*** 27.4*** 0.3826 (3.29)*** 15.5*** 30.6***
Service 0.2201 (2.77)*** 9.38*** 12.6* 0.2197 (2.13)** 18.5*** 3.20
Retail 0.1864 (2.13)*** 10.3*** 4.11 0.1801 (1.94)* 7.38** 4.51
See notes in Tables 6 and 7 for the notation
22 Berger and Udell (1998), Reid (2003) and Huyghebaert and
Van de Gucht (2007) reported that suppliers and commercial
banks are the largest provider of credit for start-up firms.
Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) found that as U.S. small firms
age and their relationships with financial institutions mature,
they become less dependent on trade credit. Fisman and Love
(2003) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) show that trade credit
Footnote 22 continued
constitutes an important source of funding for firms constrained
in financial markets.
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